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CHAPTER 7 
Conflict of Laws 
FRANCIS ]. NICHOLSON, S.]. 
§7.1. Wrongful death action: Law of state with most significant 
relationship governs damages. The Northeast Airlines flight from 
New York City to Nantucket Island, Massachusetts, ended with the 
crash of the plane at Nantucket on August 15, 1958. This crash resulted 
in much litigation involving wrongful death actions and choice of 
laws and led to the well-known decisions Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 
Inc.,1 Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,2 and Gore v. Northeast Air-
lines, Inc.S These cases were discussed in the 1963 SURVEy.4 During the 
1967 SURVEY year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit heard the appeal from the district court decision in Gore.5 
The reversal of the judgment of the federal district court in Gore 
justifies another look at some of the key issues in this litigation. 
In Gore, the plaintiff, a citizen of Maryland, was executor of the 
estate of one of the victims. He brought suit under the Massachusetts 
wrongful death statute6 against the defendant airline for damages of 
$1,750,000. The action was originally brought in a New York court 
but was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York. The decedent had been a domiciliary of New 
York and the defendant airline was a Massachusetts corporation. The 
defendant made the affirmative defense that the Massachusetts statute 
limited recoverable damage to $15,000.7 The plaintiff moved to strike 
this defense, asserting that since the court's jurisdiction rested upon 
diversity of citizenship, it had to apply New York conflict of laws doc-
trine.s In determining the applicable New York conflict of laws rule, 
the court looked to the rule set forth in Kilberg.9 
In Kilberg, the district court, in rejecting the Massachusetts limit 
as to the amount of damages, applied a "contacts" approach in order 
FRANCIS J. NICHOLSON, S.J., is Associate Professor of Law at Boston College Law 
School and a member of the District of Columbia and Massachusetts Bars. 
§7.1. 19 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). 
2309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963). 
S 222 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
4 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §8.1. 
5 Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967). 
6 G.L., c. 229, §2. 
7 Id. The statute has since been amended three times to raise the upper limits of 
recovery to $50,000. 
s 373 F.2d at 720. 
P 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). 
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to effect New York public policy. The New York policy, as defined in 
Kilberg, is that such a statutory limitation of damages as the Massa-
chusetts statute sets out is against the interest of decedent's dependents 
who are New York domiciliaries.10 Hence, where the dependents are 
New York domiciliaries, New York choice of laws will dictate that 
such statutory limitations not be applied. The status of the next of 
kin, therefore, was critical in determining the applicability of the 
Kilberg rule to wrongful death action statutes of other states. 
The district court noted that the Gore case was similar to Kilberg 
in that New York was the domicile of the decedent and also the place 
where he bought his ticket and boarded the plane. But the two cases 
were dissimilar with respect to the domiciles of the beneficiaries. 
The decedent in Gore was survived by a widow and two infant chil-
dren, all residents of New York at the time of his death. The deceased 
was also survived by an adult daughter, and a son aged nineteen. 
These latter two children were both born of a prior marriage and had 
been domiciled in California before the decedent's death. One month 
after the decedent's death, his widow and two infant children moved 
from New York to Maryland where they have been domiciled ever 
since. None of the five beneficiaries, therefore, was a New York domi-
ciliary when the suit was commenced. 
The court pointed out that the California and Maryland courts 
would have had to apply the Massachusetts wrongful death statute 
with respect to the limitation of damages.11 The court concluded that 
it could hardly be argued that New York had a legally recognizable 
interest in the decedent's dependents sufficient to justify New York's 
courts in refusing to apply the damage limitation in the Massachusetts 
statute.12 The court therefore denied the plaintiff's motion to strike 
the affirmative defense. 
The defendant Northeast, claiming that on the pleadings there was 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that upon these material 
facts it was, as a matter of law, entitled to a defendant's judgment, 
moved, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b), for sum-
mary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's wrongful death action insofar 
as it sought damages in excess of $15,000. Northeast also moved pur-
suant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) that judgment be 
entered against Northeast on the pleadings in the plaintiff's favor for 
$15,000 on the wrongful death cause of action. Both of Northeast's 
motions were granted in an unreported opinion, and a final judgment 
was entered thereon. The plaintiff appealed only from so much of the 
judgment as limited damages to $15,000 in the wrongful death cause 
of action.13 
The court of appeals found, after an examination of New York cases, 
10Id. at 40, 172 N.E.2d at 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 528. 
11222 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
12Id. 
13 Id. at 720. 
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that the reasons behind New York's policy proscribing statutory limi-
tations upon recoverable damages in wrongful death action were based 
upon the state's interest in preserving a citizen's life, as well as upon 
its interest in the well-being of a citizen's surviving dependents.14 It 
held that the date of death rather than the date of the commencement 
of an action for damages caused by the death was the determinative 
date as to the beneficiaries' domicile for the purpose of choosing the 
applicable state law in a wrongful death action.15 Therefore, the rele-
vant domicile of the survivors in the present case was not distinguish-
able from the New York domicile of the widows in Kilberg and Pear-
son, and the court was bound by Kilber£ts dictate that New York's 
strong public policy against such limitations would apply.16 
The court then proceeded to find another basis for the application 
of New York law in the present case. In Kilberg, the New York Court 
of Appeals had recognized the traditional rule that the lex loci delicti 
creates the cause of action for wrongful death. Hence, the substantive 
cause of action was governed by the Massachusetts statute. In holding, 
however, that New York law, not Massachusetts law, governed the 
damages issue, the court departed from the traditional rule. Two years 
after Kilberg came the landmark case of Babcock v. Jackson,17 in which 
the New York Court of Appeals rejected the familiar place-of-impact 
rule, and adopted for tort cases with multi-state settings the principle 
that the law of the state which has the significant contacts with the 
transaction controls the rights of the parties. Subsequent New York 
cases reaffirmed the Babcock rationale,18 and indicated that it was just 
as applicable to wrongful death actions as to actions for nonfatal tor-
tious injuries.19 
The federal court of appeals, after examining the present case in the 
light of the Babcock criteria, found that the New York law and pro-
cedures governing the nature and the amount of recovery for the de-
cedent's wrongful death were the most logical ones to be applied. The 
defendant Northeast could advance no contacts with Massachusetts or 
California or Maryland and no interest held by these states which 
could be regarded as superior to the contacts New York had with the 
transaction. Hence, New York possessed the superior interest in the 
consequences flowing from the decedent's death,20 and this interest 
would dictate that the New York law should be applied both as to the 
substantive cause of action and damages. 
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals in Gore marks 
another advance of the "contacts" approach in New York conflicts law. 
14 Id. at 723. 
15Id. 
HIId. 
1712 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). 
18 See, e.g., Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120,209 N.E.2d 792,262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965). 
19 See Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 
266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965). 
20373 F.2d 717, 725-726. 
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In the earlier Kilberg and Pearson cases the courts were content to 
allow the law of Massachusetts to stand as the basis for the wrongful 
death actions. Undoubtedly, the courts felt obliged to reason in this 
way because the action for wrongful death was unknown to the com-
mon law and continues to be thought of as having no existence sepa-
rate from a statutory enactment.21 The present decision, with its 
finding that New York law alone should be applied to the Massachu-
setts death, makes the "contacts" principle just as applicable to wrong-
ful death actions as to tort actions generally. Thus, the continued 
validity of the Kilberg-Pearson rationale is dubious. 
Some four months after the present decision by the federal appellate 
court, the New York Court of Appeals ratified the statement of New 
York conflicts law found in Gore. In Farber v. Smolack,22 a wrongful 
death action arising out of an automobile accident in North Carolina, 
the New York court held that the New York wrongful death statute 
determined the rights of the victim's survivors, because New York was 
the jurisdiction of the most "significant relationship" with the issue 
presented.23 The court cited Gore in support of this ruling. 
§7.2. Foreign country judgment: Prima facie evidence of under-
lying claim. In Svenska Handelsbanken v. Carlson,! the plaintiff, a 
Swedish bank, brought a diversity action in the United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts against the defendant as admin-
istrator of the estate of his deceased brother and as distributee of the 
estate. The plaintiff sought to recover on a judgment against the de-
fendant entered in a Swedish court or, alternatively, on the original 
claim on which the action in the Swedish court was based. 
The decedent, a New Jersey resident engaged in the export-import 
business, had executed a guarantee in favor of the plaintiff bank. Upon 
the decedent's death intestate, the defendant, his sole heir, was ap-
pointed administrator of his estate in New York on January II, 1961. 
The defendant was discharged as administrator by a final decree, dated 
February 5, 1962, and he received a distribution of $500,000 from the 
estate. 
During his administration of the estate, the defendant notified the 
bank of his brother's death and the bank in turn apprised the defen-
dant of the existence of the guarantee. More than a year after the de-
fendant was discharged as administrator and the estate was distributed, 
the plaintiff bank first made demand upon the defendant for payment 
under the guarantee. No suth payment was made. On January 24, 
1964, the plaintiff filed suit in a Swedish court against the defendant 
to recover the full amount of the guarantee. Service of process and of a 
copy of the complaint was made in hand upon the defendant at his 
home in Massachusetts on May 19, 1964. The defendant failed to an-
21 Id. at 723. 
2220 N.Y.2d 198,229 N.E.2d 36, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967). 
23Id. at -, 229 N.E.2d at 40, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 253. 
§7.2. 1258 F. Supp. 448 (D. Mass. 1966). 
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swer the complaint, and judgment was entered against him by the 
Swedish court on September 4, 1964. The defendant was thereafter 
served in hand with a copy of the judgment. He was also notified of 
his right to appeal or to reopen the judgment, but failed to exercise it. 
The plaintiff bank first contended that the judgment of the Swedish 
court should be given conclusive effect and judgment be entered upon 
it. The district court, however, was not convinced that the Swedish 
judgment was entitled to conclusive effect. In Hilton v. Guyot2 the 
United States Supreme Court held that a judgment of a court of a 
foreign country would be given conclusive effect only if the courts of 
that nation would give similar effect to judgments rendered in the 
United States. Where such reciprocity does not exist, the foreign judg-
ment is only prima facie evidence of the correctness of the underlying 
claim. The district court noted that the plaintiff offered no evidence 
to support its assertion that the Swedish court, which rendered the 
judgment sued upon, had given conclusive effect to judgments of 
American courts. 
The court held, however, that under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins?> Massachusetts rather than federal law was applicable. On 
the basis of early Massachusetts decisions,4 the court construed the 
Massachusetts rule to be that a judgment of a court of a foreign coun-
try would be only prima facie evidence of the underlying claim, and 
that the defendant would be entitled to all the defenses he might have 
made to the original action. 
The district court then had to decide under whose laws the construc-
tion of the guarantee agreement would be made. Looking to conflicts 
of laws rules,5 the court held the contract to be governed by Swedish 
law. The district court also ruled against the defendant's statute of 
limitations argument, holding that the suit, as a contract action, was 
timely brought under the Massachusetts six-year statute.6 
The defendant finally claimed that the action was barred by appli-
cable New York probate law. The court agreed that, since the plaintiff 
presented no claim in the New York proceedings, he was barred from 
any recovery against the defendant in his capacity as administrator of 
the estate.7 However, recovery against the defendant as distributee of 
assets of the estate was authorized by Section 170 of the New York De-
cedent Estate Law.S An action based upon this section might properly 
2 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
3304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
4 E.g., Bissell v. Briggs. 9 Mass. 462 (1813); Buttrick v. Allen, 8 Mass. 273 (1811). 
5 Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws §346j (Tent. Draft No.6, 1960). 
6 C.L., c. 260, §2. 
7 Surrogate's Court Act §208 (now Surrogate's Court Procedure Act §1802). 
S N.Y. Deced. Est. Law §170, provides: "An action may be maintained, as pre-
scribed in this article, against the surviving husband or wife of a decedent, and 
the next of kin of an intestate, or the next of kin or legatees of a testator to recover, 
to the extent of the assets paid or distributed to them, for a debt of the decedent, 
upon which an action might have been maintained, against the executor or ad-
ministrator. The neglect of the creditor to present his claim to the executor or 
5
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be brought in the Massachusetts courts.9 The plaintiff bank, therefore, 
was entitled to recover the full amount of the guarantee with interest 
from the date of demand. 
Judgments rendered in a foreign country are not entitled to the 
protection of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion.10 In many states, however, such judgments, provided they comply 
with due process requirements, will be accorded the same degree of 
recognition to which sister state judgments are entitled.ll It seems 
probable that the Massachusetts prima facie evidence rule,12 based as 
it is on early Massachusetts cases, will be changed when the Supreme 
Judicial Court has the opportunity to reconsider the problem of the 
recognition of foreign country judgments. It is submitted that a rule 
which would apply the principles of res judicata to judgments ren-
dered in foreign countries would be more in accord with the public 
interest in seeing a timely end to litigation. 
The reciprocity doctrine of the Hilton case has not received much 
approbation from the commentators13 and has been rejected by many 
state courts.14 The Hilton opinion involved an appeal from a lower 
federal court, and it did not discuss whether its rule as to reciprocity 
would be binding on state courts. So far as is known, no federal or 
state court has ever made such a suggestion. As a consequence, in the 
absence of a treaty or act of Congress, the federal courts, sitting in 
diversity actions, are usually required by the Erie rule to apply the law 
of the state in which they sit as to the measure of respect that should 
be accorded a foreign country's judgment.15 Hence, the federal district 
court in the present case was correct in holding that Massachusetts 
rather than federal law as embodied in the Hilton decision was appli-
cable. 
§7.3. Amendment as to parties in diversity cases: Law of forum 
state controls. In Burns v. Turner Construction CO.1 the plaintiff 
Burns brought a diversity action in tort against a single defendant, 
Turner. The plaintiff had been injured on March 26, 1962, at the 
Children's Hospital Medical Center when a platform railing which 
he leaned against gave way and he fell to the ground below. The plain-
tiff alleged that the construction company was negligent in designing 
administrator, within the time prescribed by law for that purpose, does not impair 
his right to maintain such an action." Massachusetts has no such statute. 
9 See New York Trust Co. v. Brewster, 241 Mass. 155, 158, 134 N.E. 616, 617 (1922). 
10 U.S. Const., art. IV, §l. 
11 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §430e (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965). 
12 See Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462 (1813); Buttrick v. Allen, 8 Mass. 273 (1811). 
13 E.g., Leflar, Conflicts of Laws §70 at 132 (1959); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 132-
133 (2d ed. 1951). 
14 E.g., Coburn v. Joseph, 195 Ga. 723, 25 S.E.2d 576, 148 A.L.R. 984 (1943); John-
son v. Compagnie Generale Transat1antique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121, 46 A.L.R. 
435 (1926). 
11l See Leflar, Conflict of Laws 131-132 (1959); Restatement (Second) of Conflict 
of Laws §430e, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965). 
§7.3. 1265 F. Supp. 768 (D. Mass. 1967), also noted in §21.2 infra. 
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and installing the platfonn and its railings from which the plaintiff 
fell. The suit against Turner was commenced on March 23, 1964. The 
plaintiff filed an amended complaint on January 17, 1966, in which 
he added seven causes of action against several new defendants. The 
amended complaint was based on infonnation which the plaintiff had 
learned during discovery proceedings which he conducted in early 1965. 
The new defendants filed motions to dismiss on the ground that the 
plaintiff's suit, brought four years after the tort, was barred by the 
statute of limitations. The court granted the motions to dismiss and 
ruled that the case would stand for trial only against the original 
defendant Turner. 
Since jurisdiction in this case was based upon diversity of citizenship, 
the district court noted that the Erie doctrine required the application 
of the statute of limitations of the forum state.2 The Massachusetts 
statute of limitations for tort actions is two years from the date on 
which the cause of action occurs.3 Since the plaintiff's amended com-
plaint was filed more than two years after his injury, his causes of ac-
tion against the defendants other than Turner were marred by the 
Massachusetts statute. 
In order to amend his action pursuant to the Massachusetts statute 
of limitations,4 the plaintiff must establish the propriety of his amend-
ment as a matter of law, as well as demonstrate that the proposed 
amendments will not operate to prejudice the defendants.5 In inter-
preting this statute the Supreme Judicial Court has held that the stat-
ute pennits the substitution of parties to a cause of action,6 but it has 
never held that the statute permits the addition of new parties. In fact, 
the statute of limitations has been held to bar an amendment to a dec-
laration which seeks to bring in new defendants under a new cause of 
action.7 In the present case, the federal district court observed that the 
plaintiff amended his complaint by adding additional parties defen-
dant and new causes of action, not by substituting one defendant for 
another.s 
The district court concluded its analysis of pertinent Massachusetts 
law by stating that even if General Laws, Chapter 231, Section 51, 
would pennit the plaintiff to amend his complaint by adding addi-
tional parties, it was clear under Massachusetts law that the allowance 
of the amendments lay within the court's discretion.D Finding that a 
Massachusetts judge, in exercising his discretion, would consider such 
standards as those enumerated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
2 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
3 G.L., c. 260, §4. 
4 G.L., c. 231, §51. 
5 Burns v. Turner Const. Co., 265 F. Supp. 768, 770 (D. Mass. 1967). 
6 Chandler v. Dunlop, 311 Mass. 1, 39 N.E.2d 969 (1942); Johnson v. Carroll, 272 
Mass. 134, 172 N.E. 85 (1930). 
7 Smith v. Butler, 176 Mass. 38, 57 N.E. 322 (1900). 
s 265 F. Supp. at 770. 
D Peterson v. Cadogan, 313 Mass. 133, 46 N.E.2d 517 (1943). 
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15(c), the court ruled that those standards had not been met.10 The 
new defendants had not received notice of the suit within the two-year 
limitation period. Moreover, they probably would be prejudiced in 
defending on the merits by the passage of almost four years between 
the date of the accident and notice of the suit. The court therefore 
granted the motions to dismiss and allowed Burns to sue only the 
original defendant.11 
For Erie purposes "substance and procedure" is a phrase with a 
meaning different from that of the traditional substance-procedure dis-
tinction in conflicts law. Under the Rules of Decision Act,12 where 
state law is in issue as to matters of "substance," the law which governs 
is the law of the state in which the federal court sits.13 Since the sole 
basis for diversity jurisdiction is the prevention of local bias against 
out-of-state litigants, the outcome of each case should be the same in 
the federal court as it would be in a state court. Therefore, all matters 
materially affecting the outcome of the case are considered "substan-
tive" and must be determined by state law.14 As a result federal courts 
have been forced to follow state law with respect to matters which for 
other purposes are often treated as procedural. 
Matters of pleadings, including the amendment of pleadings, will 
ordinarily not materially affect the outcome. For Erie purposes, there-
fore, federal law will usually apply. A different case is presented, how-
ever, when the amendment has the effect of introducing new causes of 
action against new defendants which would have been barred by the 
local statute of limitations if the amendments were not permitted. 
Whether the amendment relates back to the original date of filing is a 
question which materially affects the outcome. The decision to apply 
Massachusetts law in the present case, therefore, is consistent with the 
requirements of the Erie-York rule. 
§7.4. Federal change of venue statute: Transferee district as con-
venient forum. The forum non conveniens rule, whereby a court in 
its discretion will refuse to hear a case if it conceives itself to be a 
seriously inappropriate forum,l is becoming increasingly important.2 
The doctrine is now law in about half of the states3 and has been 
espoused by the Supreme Court of the United States.4 The principle 
of forum non conveniens also underlies Section 1404(a) of the Judicial 
10265 F. Supp. at 770. 
11 Id. 
1228 U.S.C. §1652 (1964). 
13 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
14 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
§7.4. 1 See Leflar, Conflict of Laws §52 (1959); Restatement (Second) of Conflict 
of Laws §1l7e (Tent. Draft No.4, 1957); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 166·170 (3d 
ed. 1963). 
2 See 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §10.7. 
3 See Ehrenzweig and Louisell, Jurisdiction in a Nutshell §17, at 52 (1964). 
4 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). 
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Code of 1948,5 which provides for the transfer of jurisdiction among 
the federal district courts. 
In Spencer, White & Prentis, Inc. v. facet Construction Corp.6 the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
transferred the case to the District of Massachusetts in the interest of 
convenience and justice. The plaintiff, a New York corporation, con-
tracted with the defendant, a Massachusetts corpora.tion, to build a 
slurry-trench wall around the foundation of a building in Boston. The 
plaintiff brought a diversity suit for the unpaid balance allegedly due 
for its services under the contract. The defendant represented that it 
would assert a defense and counterclaim for damages caused by faulty 
performance. 
The New York federal court found that the case could be tried 
more conveniently in Boston. The court noted that it might be desir-
able for the court and jury to visit the building site, which was less 
than a mile from the United States Courthouse in Boston. All, except 
two, of the non-party witnesses were in Massachusetts and subject to 
process there but not in New York. In addition, many of the pertinent 
records were situated in Massachusetts. The court concluded, there-
fore, that "the balance of convenience of parties and witnesses and the 
interest of justice weigh heavily in favor of the District of Massachu-
setts."7 
It should be noted that, in addition to the interests of the parties, 
factors of public interest also have a place in applying the forum non 
conveniens doctrine. One of these latter considerations is the avoid-
ance of administrative difficulties for courts with crowded dockets. The 
court in the present case indicated its concern for the public interest 
when it stated that the action would come to trial several months 
sooner in the much less congested trial docket of the Federal District 
Court of Massachusetts.8 
528 U.S.C. §I404(a) (1964). 
6258 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
7Id. at 474. 
8Id. 
9
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